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I. INTRODUCTION
In the post-Cold War era, multilateral organizations have been
playing an unprecedented role in conflict management The United
Nations and a number of other international organizations have expended great resources to attempt to prevent or end bloodshed, beginning with the Persian Gulf War2 and continuing through struggles
in places such as Somalia, 3 Rwanda, 4 the Balkans,5 and Haiti.6 While
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1. Many recent works discuss the role of the United Nations and other organizations in
the maintenance of international peace and security. See, e.g., ANTHONY CLARK AREND &
ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE UN CHARTER

PARADIGM (1993); PAUL F. DIEHL, INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING (1993); WILLIAM
DURCH & BARRY BLECHMAN, KEEPING THE PEACE: THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE

EMERGING WORLD ORDER (1992); ENFORCING RESTRAINT:. COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN
INTERNAL CONFLICTS (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1993) [hereinafter ENFORCING RESTRAINT];
LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER (Lori Damrosch & David Scheffer

eds., 1991);

REGIONALISM IN WORLD POLITICS: REGIONAL ORGANIZATION AND INTER-

NATIONAL ORDER (Louise Fawcett & Andrew Hurrell eds., 1995); UNITED NATIONS,
DIVIDED WORLD: THE UN'S ROLES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 2d ed. 1993); THE UNITED NATIONS AND CIVIL WARS (Thomas G. Weiss

ed., 1995); Thomas G. Weiss, New Challengesfor U.N. Military Operations:Implementing the
Agendafor Peace, 16 WASH. U. L.Q. 51 (1993).
2. For discussion of the role played by supranational organizations in the Gulf War, see
JOHN NORTON MOORE, CRISIS IN THE GULF: ENFORCING THE RULE OF LAW (1992); Michael
J. Glennon, Agora: The Gulf Crisisin Internationaland ForeignRelations Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L
L. 63-109, 506-535 (1991); THE KUWArr CRISIS: BASIC DOCUMENTS (Elihu Lauterpacht et al.
eds., 1991); AFTER THE STORM: LESSONS FROM THE GULF WAR (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & Roger
K. Smith eds., 1992); THE GULF WAR READER: HISTORY, DOCUMENTS, OPINIONS (Micah L.

Sifry & Christopher Cerf eds., 1991).

3. See ROBERT OAKLEY & JOHN HIRSCH, SOMALIA AND OPERATION RESTORE HOPE:
REFLECTIONS ON PEACEMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING (1995); Chester Crocker, The Lessons
of Somalia, 74 FOREIGN AFF., May-June 1995,2.
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many observers would note the success of these undertakings, other
scholars and policy-makers would point to the manifold problems
emerging from this new multilateralism. One such problem has been
the tension between globalism and regionalism
As the premier
global organization, the United Nations is charged with the daunting
task of maintaining international peace and security.8 Yet alongside
the United Nations are a variety of regional organizations including
the Organization of American States, the Organization of African
Unity, the Arab League, the European Union, the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe and the North American Treaty
Organization. In many cases, these regional organizations are also
mandated by their members to respond to threats against peace and
security. Yet, this two-level approach to conflict management has led
the United Nations and certain regional arrangements to take different approaches to several critical international conflicts such as Bosnia, Haiti, and Liberia.9 This tension casts doubt on the prospects of
establishing a well-functioning, predictable post-Cold War security
system.
In an effort to examine the existing tension between regionalism
and globalism, the present Symposium explores the nature of this
conflict and discusses alternatives for ameliorating the tension. This
Article sets the stage by discussing the historical context in which the
4. See Stephen D. Goose & Franck Smyth, Arming Genocide in Rwanda, 73 FOREIGN
AFF., Sept-Oct. 1995, at 86.
5. See LENARD COHEN, BROKEN BONDS: THE DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA
(1993); Marc Weller, The InternationalResponse to the Dissolution of the Socialist FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 569 (1992); see also Mats R. Berdal, The Security
Council,Peacekeeping and InternationalConflict after the Cold War,7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 71 (1996); Christine Gray, Case Study: Consent and United Nations Peacekeeping in Yugoslavia,7 DUKE J. COM. & INT'L L. 241 (1996).
6. See, eg., Domingo E. Acevedo, The Haitian Crisis and the OAS Response: A Test of
Effectiveness in Protecting Democracy, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT, supra note 1, at 119; Ian
Martin, Haiti:Mangled Multilateralism,95 FOREIGN POL'Y 72 (1994).
7. I have previously set forth this tension in conjunction with a number of other tensions
confronting the United Nations. See Anthony Clark Arend, The United Nations and the New
World Order,81 GEo. LJ. 491 (1993).
8. In the Preamble to the United Nations Charter, "THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED
NATIONS" proclaim their determination "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of
war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind. .. " and pledge "to
unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in
the common interest.. ." U.N. CHARTER preamble. In addition, under Chapter VII of the
Charter, the United Nations Security council is empowered to determine the existence of any
"threat to the peace," "breach of the peace," or "act of agression." U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
9. See infra notes 73-110 and accompanying text.
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U.N. Charter attempted to define the relationship between the
United Nations and regional arrangements. The essential thesis of
this Article is that a fundamental tension between globalism and regionalism was present throughout the deliberations leading up to the
1945 United Nations Conference on International Organization (San
Francisco Conference) and written into the provisions of the U.N.
Charter themselves. As a consequence, many of the specific postCold War conflicts between the United Nations and regional organizations can be traced directly to the U.N. Charter framework. At the
same time, other contemporary conflicts between the global organization and regional arrangements have emerged from circumstances
not envisioned by the founders of the United Nations.
Part II of this Article briefly examines the early debates surrounding regional arrangements and the post-World War II organization. Part III explores the San Francisco Conference and the final
U.N. Charter provisions on regional arrangements. Part IV examines
the difficulties with the U.N. Charter arrangement and identifies several contemporary problems that flow from the U.N. Charter structure. Part V, in anticipation of the Symposium articles that follow,
notes certain tensions that have developed from conditions unforeseen by the delegates at the San Francisco Conference. Finally, some
concluding comments will be provided in Part VI.
II. THE EARLY DEBATE ABOUT A "NEW WORLD ORDER"
While World War II raged in Europe and Asia, the Allies began
planning the shape of the post-war order. The League of Nations had
failed in its primary task of maintaining international stability. 0 It
had taken only dilatory measures to counter Italian aggression and
had done nearly nothing to respond to the aggression of Germany
and Japan leading up to the war. Accordingly, the Allies believed
that a new organizational arrangement was needed to promote international peace and security." But as the Allies began to explore the
precise contours of such an arrangement, significant differences arose

10. See generally F.P. WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1952);
ALFRED E. ZIMMERN, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW (1936).
11. For an excellent work on the drafting of the United Nations Charter from the United
States' perspective, see RUTH B. RUSSELL & JEANNETTE E. MUTHER, A HISTORY OF THE
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 1940-1945 (1958). One of the
classic analyses of the Charter provisions is LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS (3d rev. ed. 1969).

6

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 7:3

about the relationship between the soon-to-be global organization
and existing and future regional arrangements." One side of the debate was associated with its chief advocate, British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill, and the other side with its main supporter,
American Secretary of State Cordell Hull.
Winston Churchill believed that the post-war order should consist of both a centralized organization and a series of regional councils. But for Churchill, the primary role for-the maintenance of international peace and security would rest with the regional councils,
each of which would be led by a great power of that region. Hence,
the United States would effectively preside over a regional council in
the Americas, Britain would guide a regional council in Europe, and
other regional hegemons would lead their councils. A central organization would exist, but it would play a role secondary to that of the
regional councils.3 This view apparently had some important sympathizers.
As Professor Inis Claude has pointed out, although
"President Franklin D. Roosevelt had not clearly committed himself
to a scheme of postwar organization... he tended to agree with the
ChurchiUian conception."'
In opposition to Churchill's vision was the arrangement preferred by Cordell Hull. Hull favored a strong global organization
that would play the primary role in conflict management. There
could be regional organizations, but their role was to be clearly subordinate. Hull's opposition to Churchill's proposal seemed to stem
from two very specific concerns. First, he feared that a framework in
which regional organizations had primary responsibility would degenerate into a system of competing alliances. 5 Second, Hull was
concerned that the arrangement Churchill supported would encourage American isolationism. As Hull explained in his memoirs, the
Churchillian system could serve as "a haven for the isolationists, who
could advocate all-out United States cooperation in a Western Hemisphere council on condition that we did not participate in a European
or Pacific council."' 6
12. The classic work on this debate is Inis L. Claude, The OAS, the UN, and the United
States, 547 INT'L CONCILIATION 3 (1964). This Article draws heavily on Professor Claude's
analysis.
13. See id. at 5.
14. Id.
15. See id.
16. 2 CORDELL HULL, THE MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL 1645 (1948), cited in Claude,
supra note 12, at 5.
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Despite the apparent opposition of the U.S. and British heads of
state, the Allies came to adopt Hull's approach. In October of 1943,
China, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States
signed the Moscow Declaration. In this document, the four parties
declared "[t]hat they recognize the necessity of establishing at the
earliest practicable date a general international organization, based
on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States,
and open to membership by all such States, large and small, for the
maintenance of international peace and security."18 The Declaration
made no mention of regional organizations of any kind. It was clear
that the preference was for a strong, centralized organization.
With globalism in the ascendancy, the Allies then proceeded to
draft a constitution for the new international organization. In the
late summer and early fall of 1944, representatives of the four powers
met at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, D.C. to prepare the first
draft of the U.N. Charter (Dumbarton Oaks draft). 9 Not surprisingly, the Dumbarton Oaks draft reflected the primacy of the central
organization. Chapter Eight, Section C of the Dumbarton Oaks draft
permitted the existence of regional arrangements dealing with international peace and security, "provided such arrangements or agencies
and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of
the Organization."'' Moreover, the Security Council of the central
Organization was to "encourage settlement of local disputes through
such regional arrangements

. .

." and, "where appropriate, utilize such

arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority.
...,, But there was a critical restriction. Under the provisions of the

Dumbarton Oaks draft, "no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the
authorization of the Security Council.""2 In essence, the Dumbarton
Oaks draft would have codified Hull's approach.

17. Declaration of the Four Nations on General Security, Moscow Conference, Oct. 19-30,
1943, reprinted in ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS
DOCUMENTS 1941-1945 13 (1946) [hereinafter UNITED NATONS DOCUMENTS 1941-45].
18. Id. at 13.
19. For a discussion of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, see ROBERT HILDEBRAND,
DUMBARTON OAKS: THE ORIGINS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE SEARCH FOR POSTWAR

SECURITY (1990).
20. Dumbarton Oaks Conversations on World Organization, August 21-October 7, 1944,
reprintedin UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS 1941-1945, supranote 17, at 92,101.
21. Id. at 101.
22. Id.
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Despite the agreement of the four major powers at Dumbarton
Oaks, the Dumbarton Oaks draft met serious challenges when it was
presented to other states. The Latin American states in particular
were troubled by the secondary role given to regional organizations
in the area of conflict management. This concern became clear at the
Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, held in3
Mexico City in February and March 1945 (Mexico City Conference).
When the American delegation went to the Mexico City Conference,
one of its main purposes was to obtain the support of the Latin
American states for the Dumbarton Oaks draft. However, at the
conference, the Latin Americans offered a number of suggestions for
revising the Dumbarton Oaks draft. As Professor Claude has explained, "representatives of the Latin American states expressed
their misgivings about the universalist bias of the Dumbarton Oaks
Proposals, affirmed the value of the Inter-American system, proclaimed the intent to refurbish and strengthen that system, and insisted that the constitution of the new world organization should
leave the way open for the functioning of a politically active and
largely autonomous Inter-American agency."' While the American
Delegation succeeded in softening some of the initial proposals presented at the Mexico City Conference,' the United States essentially
agreed to support a stronger role for the Inter-American system at
the San Francisco Conference. 2 This support was symbolized by the
United States agreeing to the Act of Chapultepec, one of the main
resolutions of the Mexico City Conference.'
III. THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE
On April 25, 1945, the United Nations Conference on International Organization convened in San Francisco to draft the final constitutive document for the new world organization. Using the Dum23. See RUSSELL & MUTHER, supranote 11, at 555-572 for a discussion of the Mexico City
Conference.
24. Claude, supra note 12, at 6.
25. RUSSELL & MUTHER, supra note 11, at 557-566.
26. Professor Claude states that the United States, in signing the Act of Chapultepec, (one
of the resolutions adopted at the Conference) virtually acknowledged its responsibility for
helping to secure the alteration of the Dumbarton Oaks draft in a pro-regionalist direction, and
accepted the necessity of collaborating to some degree with its Latin neighbors in their projected campaign to make the United Nations Charter safe for regionalism. Claude, supra note
12, at 6-7.
27. See id.
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barton Oaks draft as a guide, the delegates of 49 independent states
met for a month to refine the U.N. Charter. During the San Francisco Conference, states raised a variety of concerns about the provisions of the Dumbarton Oaks draft dealing with regional arrangements. In particular, three major concerns were presented. Two
came from the Latin American states, and one came from the Soviets
and the French.
A. The Latin American Concerns
Following the general tenor of the Mexico City Conference, the
Latin American states were intent on enhancing the role of the InterAmerican system at the San Francisco Conference. Two specific deficiencies in the Dumbarton Oaks draft troubled them. First, they
were bothered by the provision that no enforcement action could
take place without the authorization of the Security Council. The
proposed voting procedure for the Security Council enshrined the
principle of the great power veto. Each of the permanent members
of the Security Council, the United States, Great Britain, France, the
Soviet Union, and China, could veto resolutions authorizing the use
of force. As a consequence, it was feared that if a state committed an
act of aggression against a Latin American state, the Security Council
would be unable to act due to the exercise of the veto, and other
Latin American states would have to sit helplessly by while the aggressor continued to use force. The Latin Americans therefore
wanted some provision in the U.N. Charter that would allow action
by Latin American regional organizations in such cases.
The second major concern of the Latin American states related
to the peaceful settlement of international disputes. The Dumbarton
Oaks draft, in Chapter Eight, Section A, addressed the question of
the pacific settlement of disputes. It empowered the Security Council
to investigate disputes that could disrupt international peace and security and established an obligation on the part of states to seek to
settle "any dispute... [the] continuance [of which] is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." ' But much
to the dismay of Latin American delegations, the provisions of this
section made no mention whatsoever of regional arrangements. The
general belief of these delegations was that Latin American states
should be under a legal obligation to submit regional disputes to the
28. Dumbarton Oaks Conversations on World Organization, supranote 20, at 98-99.
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regional organization before submitting them to the United Nations.29
Only if the Latin American organization was unsuccessful in resolving the problem should the matter be taken to the Security Council.
To rectify these deficiencies, an Amendment to the Dumbarton
Oaks draft was presented prior to the San Francisco Conference by
the delegations of Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Peru.
It provided that "[d]isputes or conflicts arising between states which
belong to a given regional system shall be settled according to the
agreements or statutes of that system. . . ." But, the proposal continued, "this will not prevent the Security Council from fulfilling the
functions assigned to it, when it has not been or is not possible to settle the dispute or conflict satisfactorily by applying the measures contemplated in the corresponding regional agreement or statutes, and it
will be the duty of said regional body to determine in agreement with
the procedure set forth in its statutes when such a case arises."3
Hence, under this formulation not only would states be obligated to
resort to regional arrangements first, but the regional organization
would have the power to determine when the issue could be brought
to the Security Council.
B. The Soviet-French Concern
One of the issues that surfaced in some of the conversations between the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet
Union and China (the "Big Five") preceding the San Francisco Conference related to the problem of renewed German aggression and
the authority of the "new world organization." Both the Soviets and
French had concluded defense agreements that would be activated in
the event of further German aggression. 2 They feared that the new
multilateral security arrangement could be somehow construed to
trump these agreements. As a consequence, they desired an explicit
provision in the U.N. Charter exempting such anti-German arrangements from the prohibition in the Dumbarton Oaks draft that there
could be no enforcement action without the mandate of the Security
Council. Ultimately, the Great Powers agreed to present an amend29. See Claude, supranote 12, at 10.
30. Proposal cited in RUSSELL& MUTHER, supranote 11, at 689.
31. Id.
32. The Soviets had concluded such agreements with Great Britain, Czechoslovakia,
France, Yugoslavia, and the Lublin Government of Poland. See RUSSELL & MUTHER, supra
note 11, at 690 n.6.
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ment (the italicized portion) at the San Francisco Conference providing that:
no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against enemy states
in this war provided for pursuant to Chapter XHi, paragraph2, or in
regional arrangementsdirected against renewal of aggressive policy
on the part of such states, until such time as the Organizationmay,

by consent of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventingfurther aggression by a State now at war
with the United Nations.
C. The Response of the San Francisco Conference
In light of these three concerns, the delegates at the San Francisco Conference attempted to change the Dumbarton Oaks approach to regional arrangements.' Given that the Great Powers had
agreed to make an exception to the prohibition of enforcement actions for regional organizations directly against the enemy states, the
inclusion of such an exception in the U.N. Charter seemed virtually
assured. But this exception raised the ire of the Latin American
delegations, who had wanted a similar exception for any Latin
American regional organization that would be established.35
The position of the Latin American states was supported by U.S.
Senator Arthur Vandenberg, the American delegate to the committee dealing with regional arrangements.3" Vandenberg, a prominent
Republican and member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
had been appointed to the American delegation presumably to avoid
the kind of partisanship that had poisoned the League of Nations
33. RUSSELL & MUTHER, supra note 11, at 692 (citing 3 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED
(1945)).
34. Professor Alan Henrikson, in his article in this Symposium, also discusses the "three
'fundamental concessions"' that were made at San Francisco to accommodate the proponents
of regionalism. Alan K. Henrikson, The United Nations and Regional Organizations: "KingLinks" of a "Global Chain," DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 35,38 (1996) (quoting Francis 0. Wilcox, Regionalism and the United Nations, in The United Nations in the Balance: Accomplishments and Prospects 425,427 (Norman J. Padelford & Leland M. Goodrich eds., 1965)).
35. Russell and Muther report that Senator Arthur Vandenberg "consulted with Nelson
Rockefeller, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, who reported that the
Latin American representatives were 'up in arms' on this very point." RUSSELL & MUTHER,
supranote 11, at 694.
36. Id. at 694.
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 688
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twenty-five years earlier. He too was troubled by the implications of
permitting a special exception for Europe. He believed that "Europe
would have freedom of action for her defensive regional arrangements (pending the time when the Peace League [i.e., the United Nations] shall prove its dependability as a substitute policeman) but the
Western Hemisphere would not have similar freedom of action under
its Pan-American agreement. . . ."' Accordingly, Vandenberg suggested an amendment to provide an additional exemption for
"measures which may be taken under.., the Act of Chapultepec of
the Inter-American Conference on the Problems of Peace and War..
. until such time as the Organization may, by the consent of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union, be charged with this function .... ."" Such an arrangement would allow the Inter-American
system to be free from the U.N. Charter prohibition on unauthorized
enforcement actions until the regional arrangement itself decided
that the Security Council could indeed carry out its function.
Vandenberg's proposal split the U.S. delegation.39 Some of the
delegates feared that if a special exception were granted to the Latin
American regional organization, other states would demand similar
exemptions for other future regional arrangements. This would, they
believed, effectively emasculate the United Nations: "[I]n place of a
world system capable of stopping aggression everywhere, reliance for
security would come to rest on regional groups-large states surrounded by smaller states in spheres of influence-which would eventually convert the world into armed camps."'' In short, the arrangement would create precisely the type of world that Cordell Hull had
sought to avoid. Regional organizations would, in effect, be able to
operate outside the jurisdiction of the Security Council with regard to
the use of force. 41
Ultimately, after much discussion within the American delegation, a compromise was reached. Since the main concern of the Latin
American states had been the consequences that the prohibition of
enforcement action might have on regional self-defense actions, a
37. THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF SENATOR VANDENBERG 187 (Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr.

ed., 1952).
38. Id. at 188.
39. See id.
40. RUSSELL & MUTHER, supra note 11, at 696 (describing the arguments made by
Vandenberg's opponents in a memorandum to the delegation).
41. See id. at 695 (noting that the Vandenberg proposal would exempt "regional organizations involving the use of force" from Security Council jurisdiction).
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new provision was proposed to address precisely that issue. But
rather than being placed in the section on regional arrangements
(Chapter Eight, Section C of the Dumbarton Oaks draft), this provision was to appear in the general section on responding to aggression
(Chapter Eight, Section B of the Dumbarton Oaks draft).42 This draft
provision read as follows:
Should the Security Council not succeed in preventing aggression,
and should aggression occur by any state against any other member
state, such member state possesses the inherent right to take necessary measures for self-defense. The right to take such measures for
self-defense against armed attack shall also apply to understandings
or arrangements like those embodied in the Act of Chapultepec,
under which all members of a group of states agree to consider an
attack against any one of them as an attack against all of them. The
taking of such measures shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under this Charter to take at
in order to maintain
any time such action as it may deem necessary
43
or restore international peace and security.
This formulation solved many problems. First, it addressed the
fundamental worry of the Latin American delegations-the ability of
their regional arrangements to act in collective self-defense in circumstances where a veto in the Security Council would block U.N.
action. Second, it gave special recognition to the Latin American system by mentioning the Act of Chapultepec by name. Third, it addressed Latin American concerns without allowing a blanket regional
exception to Security Council jurisdiction on security issues.
When this proposal of the United States delegation was shared
with the other members of the Big Five, it met initial resistance. 44 After discussion and consultation, however, they accepted a slightly revised version. The only major difference in the new draft was that it
did not mention the Act of Chapultepec by name. 5
42. See id at 697.
43. Id. at 698. This proposed amendment was put forth by the U.S. delegation. Id.
44. See id. at 699.
45. The proposed amendment to VIII-B of the Dumbarton Oaks draft, offered by the
British delegation, provided that
[n]othing in this Charter should invalidate the right of self-defense against armed attack, either individual or collective, in the event of the Security Council failing to take
the necessary steps to maintain or restore international peace and security. Measures
taken in the exercise of this right shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the responsibility of the Security Council under this
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While the United States found this proposal acceptable, the
Latin American delegations were somewhat skeptical.4 ' As Russell
and Muther explain, "[t]he Latin American delegates continued to
fear. . . that the Security Council might later declare the interAmerican system inconsistent with the U.N. Charter., 47 To appease
these concerns, the United States assured the Latin Americans that
the American veto on the Council would preclude such a declaration.4 Additionally, the "United States agreed to certain Latin
American proposals: that the Charter reference to 'encouraging' pacific settlement through regional arrangements (in Section VIII-C [of
Dumbarton Oaks]) should be strengthened, and that the United
States should guarantee the continued validity of the Act of
Chapultepec. ' '49 Following these promises, the Latin American states
finally agreed to the proposal.
The United States was now committed to addressing the Latin
American concerns regarding the pacific settlement of international
disputes. To respond to this problem, the Big Five agreed on two
amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks draft. First, they agreed to
make specific mention of the "resort to regional agencies or arrangements" in Section VIII-A.f Hence, the section providing that
states would have an obligation to seek to settle disputes, "the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of internapeace and security," would list regional organizations explictional
51
itly.

Second, the Big Five agreed to include language in Section VIIIC to provide for the apparent legal obligation of regional arrangements to settle local disputes. Drawing upon the proposal of Chile,
Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Peru, the Big Five proposed incorporating a sentence providing that "[t]he member states comprising such agencies or entering into such arrangements should make
every effort to achieve peaceful settlement of local disputes through
Charter to take at any time such action as it may deem necessary in order to maintain
or restore international peace and security.
Id.
46. See id. at 699-700.
47. Id. at 700.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Amendment Proposedby the FourSponsoring Governments and
France to Section VIII-A, 3, in THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 87,173 (1946) [hereinafter U.N.C.I.O.].
51. Id.
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such agencies or arrangements before referring them to the Security
Council."52 But the Big Five qualified this "obligation" with the important caveat that "[t]his paragraph in no way impairs the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section A of this chapter."53 Under
paragraph 1, the Security Council was allowed to "investigate any
dispute, or any situation which may lead to international friction or
give rise to a dispute."' Under paragraph 2, "any state... may bring
any such dispute or situation to the attention of the General Assembly or the Security Council." 5 Thus, despite the appearance of a legal
obligation for members of regional arrangements to settle local disputes before resorting to the United Nations, the Big Five's proposal
still allowed the Council to intervene at any time and ultimately provided that states always had the option of immediate recourse to the
United Nations.
With these proposals before the Conference, the delegates proceeded to adopt similar provisions for the final version of the U.N.
Charter. Hence, when the U.N. Charter entered into force on October 24, 1945, the position of regional organizations had been greatly
elevated above the arrangement inDumbarton Oaks.
D. The U.N. Charter Provisions on Regionalism
Given the course of the San Francisco Conference, the U.N.
Charter provisions on regional arrangements reflect an accommodation of each of the three concerns raised about the Dumbarton Oaks
draft.
1. Enforcement Actions and Regional Use of Force: Article 51.
As noted earlier, the Dumbarton Oaks agreement provided that
there could be no enforcement action without the authorization of
the Security Council. The fear of the Latin American states that a
paralyzed Security Council would prevent regional action was
addressed in Article 51:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has
52. U.N.C.I.O., supra note 50, at 193.
53. Id.
54. Dumbarton Oaks Conversations, Chapter VIII-A, para. 1, 1946-47 U.N.Y.B. 4,7, U.N.
Sales No. 1947.1.18.
55. Id. para. 2.
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taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right
of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of
the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

2. Peaceful Settlement of InternationalDisputes: Articles 33 and
52. The Latin American concern regarding the resolution of
international disputes found its way into two articles of the U.N.
Charter. Article 33, paragraph 1, which establishes the obligation of
states to settle disputes that could endanger international peace,
security, or justice, lists regional arrangements as an option for states'
use in carrying out this obligation:
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall,
first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies
or arrangements,or other peaceful means of their own choice.57

Article 52 addresses the desire to establish an obligation to take
issues to the regional organization before going to the United Nations. Paragraph 2 provides that "[t]he Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies
shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes
through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council. 5 ' But the caveat also
found its way into the U.N. Charter. Paragraph 4 of Article 52 provides that "[t]his Article in no way impairs the application of Articles
34 and 35." These articles were the provisions that permitted the Security Council to intervene at any stage of a conflict (Article 34)59 and
allowed states to retain the option to go to the Security Council im-

56. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
57. Id. art. 33, para. 1 (emphasis added).
58. Id. art. 52, para. 2.
59. Article 34 provides that "[tihe Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any
situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance
of international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art. 34.
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mediately (Article 35).' °
What this U.N. Charter arrangement on pacific settlement
should mean in practice is unclear. The Latin American states generally regarded it as a victory for regionalism.' However, the desires
of the Latin American states notwithstanding, the U.N. Charter did
not establish an absolute legal obligation for members of regional organizations to take local disputes to the local organization. As Cordell Hull's successor as Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius explained, this arrangement merely "ma[de] more clear that regional
agencies will be looked to as an important way of settling local disputes by peaceful means."6 Stettinius later told President Truman
that paragraph 4 of Article 52 "insure[d] the paramount authority of
the Council and its right to concern itself if necessary with disputes of
this [regional] character."" Thus, the most the U.N. Charter did was
provide a good-faith obligation to attempt to settle local disputes
through the regional organizations, while establishing no true legal
obligation.
3. Use of Force Against Enemy States: Article 53. The concern
raised by the French and the Soviets that the U.N. Charter
prohibition on enforcement actions without the consent of the
Council would emasculate anti-German treaties was addressed in
Article 53:
1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its
authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional
arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of
60. Article 35 provides, in part:
1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the
nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of
the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it
accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.
U.N. CHARTER art. 35, paras. 1-2.
61. See Claude, supranote 12, at 11-12.
62. Statement for the Press,15 May 1945, No. 25, reprinted in On the Charterof the United
Nations: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 79th Cong. 306
(1945).
63. Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference by the Chairman of the United States Delegation, The Secretary of State, Pub. No. 2399, Conf. Series 71 at
405 (Dep't State 1945).
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the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any
enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for
pursuant to Article 107" or in regional arrangements directed
against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state,
until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.
2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an
enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.0
Under these articles, the U.N. Charter preserved the basic prohibition on unauthorized enforcement actions while allowing for regional action both in self-defense and in response to renewed enemy
aggression. But these provisions left many questions unresolved:
What is an enforcement action? Are there regional uses of force,
other then these two explicit exceptions, that do not qualify as enforcement actions? And, what is an "armed attack"? Do states have
to be "hit first" before they can respond under Article 51?
IV. THE TENSIONS IN THE U.N. CHARTER ARRANGEMENT
A review of the U.N. Charter's history illustrates that it failed to
unambiguously define the relationship between regional arrangements and the United Nations. Instead, the U.N. Charter provided
language that satisfied all the parties in 1945. But that very language
contains the seed of some of the tensions that have recently presented themselves in contemporary conflicts. Two unresolved issues
have been especially troublesome: (1) The question of initial jurisdiction and (2) the meaning of "enforcement action".
A. Initial Jurisdiction
When an international conflict occurs, which organization is
supposed to handle it? The United Nations? The applicable regional
organization? The U.N. Charter provisions do not provide a clear answer. Yet these are precisely the kinds of questions that have been
raised repeatedly since the U.N. Charter was adopted. As Professor
64. Article 107 provides that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude
action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any
signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action." U.N. CHARTER art. 107.

65. U.N. CHARTER art. 53.
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Alan Henrikson argues in his article in this Symposium," throughout
the Cold War period a variety of cases arose in which jurisdiction of
the United Nations and the respective regional organization was at
issue.' More recently, the jurisdictional question has emerged in the
Gulf War, the Balkans, and Haiti, as explained below.
1. The Gulf War. The U.N. Security Council became
immediately involved following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi
troops on August 2, 1990. The Council adopted a series of dramatic
resolutions that condemned the invasion and imposed diplomatic and
economic sanctions." But at least one observer indicated that he
believed the Arab League-the relevant regional organizationshould have taken up the issue. Clovis Maksoud, the Ambassador
from the Arab League to the United Nations, believed the Arab
League should have attempted to resolve the dispute between Iraq
and Kuwait before the United Nations took more forceful actions.
In fact, Maksoud even asserted that there was a legal obligation to
take the matter to the Arab League first. In an article written some
time after the invasion, he queried: "Why was the United States so
eager to frustrate Arab efforts by seeking U.N. enforcement of
international law when the U.N. Charter itself requires that regional
organizations seek solutions first?"70 Following the United Nations'
lead, the Arab League immediately condemned the Iraqi action on
August 3. On August 10, League Members' heads of state echoed
this condemnation and decided to support the Saudi request for
military assistance. Maksoud himself resigned to protest the limited
regional response.7
Even though it seems clear from the U.N. Charter that there was
no legal obligation for the League to address the matter before U.N.
consideration,' the fact that Maksoud could make that argument
demonstrates the ambiguities in the U.N. Charter. Clearer provisions
66. See Henrikson, supranote 34.
67. Id. at 43-52.
68. See S.C. Res. 661,U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933rd mtg., at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661
(1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1323, 1325-1327 (1990) (imposing diplomatic and economic sanctions on Iraq); S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/660
(1990), reprintedin 29 I.L.M. 1323, 1325 (1990) (condemning the invasion of Kuwait).
69. See Clovis Maksoud, The Arab World's Quandary,8WORLD POL'Y J.551 (1991).
70. Id. at 554.
71. See Arend, supra note 7, at 516-18 (discussing Haiti's case).
72. See supratext accompanying notes 52-55.
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in the U.N. Charter could perhaps have prevented such confusion.
2. The Balkans.' A similar jurisdictional problem arose in the
Balkans. In the early 1990s, as the Republic of Yugoslavia was
breaking up in a bloody civil war, it was unclear which organization
should address the problem. The United Nations was initially
reluctant to become involved, but so were regional bodies such as the
European Community, the West European Union, and NATO. It
appeared as though the regional organizations and the global
organization were deferring to each other, without any organization
willing to take up the issue.' Ultimately, on September 25, 1991, the
U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 713 which declared the
situation a threat to international peace and security and imposed an
Nearly five months later, the Security Council
arms embargo.'
authorized the deployment of peacekeeping troops as the United
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR I).76 After fighting broke
out in Bosnia and the magnitude of the tragedy reached disastrous
proportions, the Council adopted Resolution 770 on August 13, 1992,
which called upon "[s]tates to take nationally or through regional
agencies or arrangements all measures necessary to facilitate in
coordination with the United Nations the delivery by relevant U.N.
humanitarian organizations and others of humanitarian assistance to
Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and
Herzogovina."' While this resolution seemed to invite regional
organizations to take action, none came forward. Eventually, the
United Nations established the United Nations Protection Force II
73. This account draws heavily upon Ivo Daalder, Fearand Loathing in the Former Yugoslavia, in THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF INTERNAL CONFLICT 35, 47-53 (Michael E.
Brown ed., 1996) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS] and James B. Steinberg, International Involvement in the Yugoslavia Conflict, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER, supra note 1, at 27.

74. Steinberg discusses the "choice of institution" problem. He explains that "[a] broadly
shared consensus at the beginning of the Yugoslav conflict held that primary responsibility for
helping to resolve the conflict lay with regional institutions." Steinberg, supra note 73, at 55.
But, he notes, "[flor a number of reasons... the regional organizations, both European and
transatlantic (CSCE, EC, WEU, and NATO), proved of limited use." Id. at 56.
75. S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. SIRES/713 (1991),
reprintedin 31 I.L.M. 1427, 1431-32 (1992). See generally Steinberg, supra note 73, at 38-39
(discussing the involvement of regional organizations and the U.N. in the Balkans).
76. S.C. Res 743, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3055th mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/743 (1992),
reprintedin 31 I.L.M. 1428,1447-1449 (1992).
77. S.C. Res. 770, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. SIRES/770 (1992),
reprintedin 31 I.L.M. 1429, 1468-70 (1992); see Steinberg, supra note 73, at 41-44.
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(UNPROFOR II) to provide humanitarian assistance. 78 But as the
conflict continued, so too did the uneasy relationship between the
United Nations and regional arrangements. In May of 1993, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 824, establishing a series of
"safe areas" within Bosnia.7 On June 4 1993, the Security Council
authorized UNPROFOR to use force, if necessary, to insure the
integrity of the safe area.' However, in the same resolution, the
Security Council decided that
Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations
or arrangements, may take, under the authority of the Security
Council and subject to close coordination with the SecretaryGeneral and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures, through the use
of air power, in and around the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, to support UNPROFOR in the performance of
its mandate."'
This resolution represented a U.N. authorization for NATO airstrikes. But as NATO undertook these airstrikes, "Boutros-Ghali
and others worried that using NATO air power to suppress Bosnian
Serb air defenses would be seen as a hostile act that would take
UNPROFOR beyond the limits of a peacekeeping operation and
make it a party to the conflict."' Unfortunately, just such claims
were made and, as Chantal de Jonge Oudraat explained,
"UNPROFOR's position became increasingly murky and difficult as
time went by. ' ' u Indeed, "[a]t various points in the conflict, Bosnian
Serbs took U.N. peacekeepers hostage to deter further NATO action."g' Ultimately, the United Nations "abandoned enforcement as a
means of fulfilling its mandate."" With the conclusion of the Dayton

78. S.C. Res. 776, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3114th mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S1RES1776 (1992),
reprintedin 31 I.L.M. 1430, 1472-73 (1992); see Steinberg, supranote 73, at 44.
79. S.C. Res. 824, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3208th mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/824 (1993)
(establishing Sarajevo, Tusla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac, Srebrenica, "and their surroundings" as
"safe areas," noting that these areas "should be free from armed attacks and from any other
hostile act[s]").
80. S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3228th mtg., at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/836 (1993).
81. Id.
82. Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, The United Nations and Internal Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS, supranote 73, at 489,516.
83. Id.
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. Daalder, supra note 73, at 66.
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Accord,' the International Force (IFOR) was created as a NATO
operation and the United Nations moved to the periphery.
3. Haiti. In Haiti, the issue came in a different form. The U.N.
Security Council did not even convene following the coup against
Jean-Bertrand Aristide on September 30, 1991Y The Organization
of American States (OAS), however, did meet. At an ad hoc meeting
of foreign ministers on October 2, the Latin American states
condemned the coup and recommended that their member states
impose diplomatic and economic sanctions. The next day, the
Security Council convened, but it did not adopt a resolution. Instead,
the members of the Council verbally condemned the coup and
expressed their support for the OAS actions. The U.N. General
Assembly subsequently took up the situation in Haiti and did adopt a
resolution condemning the action." Under Article 10 of the U.N.
Charter, General Assembly resolutions such as this are non-binding
and serve only as recommendations to U.N. members.89
As time passed, however, the OAS actions appeared not to be
producing any change in the regime. 9° As a consequence, the United
States took the matter to the Security Council in 1992." On June 16,
1993, the Security Council adopted Resolution 841, which imposed an
embargo on Haiti for petroleum, petroleum products, arms, and
"related materiel of all types."' Shortly thereafter, negotiations began in an effort to provide a peaceful transfer of power back to the
86. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nov. 15-Dec.
14, 1995, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 75, 89-92 (1996).
87. This account draws heavily upon Arend, supra note 7, at 500-503. It also draws upon
Marc W. Chernick, Peacemaking and Violence in Latin America, in INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS, supranote 73, at 267.
88. G.A. Res. 46/7, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., 31st plen. mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. A1RES/46/7
(1991).
89. Article 10 provides that
[t]he General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of
the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for
in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12 [prohibiting the General
Assembly from making recommendations on a matter currently before the Security
Council.], may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to
the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.
U.N. CHARTER art. 10 (emphasis added).
90. See Acevedo, supra note 6, at 134.
91. See Chernick, supra note 87, at 290-291 ("In late 1992, the Bush administration
brought the case before the United Nations, implicitly recognizing the limits of the OAS.").
92. S.C. Res. 841, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3238th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 (1993), reprintedin 32 I.L.M. 1206, 1206-1209 (1993).
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Aristide regime.93 The resulting Governors Island Agreement, however, produced no such transfer. The Security Council then moved to
impose a naval blockade on Haiti and ultimately authorized "all necessary measures" to restore the Aristide regime.' But moments before a U.S.-led invasion could take place, the regime of Raul Cedras
voluntarily stepped down from power.95
The United Nations' initial reluctance to respond to the crisis in
Haiti seems due to perceptions of Security Council members that the
matter was a domestic conflict and thus not the proper subject for international actions.96 In contrast, the member states of the OAS believed the matter to be rightfully one of international jurisdiction and
most likely would have preferred to have the United Nations address
the conflict instead of the OAS. 97
These three cases-and undoubtedly others that could be
added-indicate that there is no clear standard that can be used to
determine whether the United Nations or the appropriate regional
organization should address a particular dispute. This lack of a standard would seem to damage the legitimacy of both the United Nations and the involved regional organization. s
B. The Meaning of "Enforcement Action"
As previously noted, Article 53 of the U.N. Charter allows the
Security Council to use regional arrangements for the conduct of
"enforcement actions," but prohibits such actions without the Council's consent. The U.N. Charter, however, leaves unclear the meaning
of the words "enforcement action." In fact, the reference to
"enforcement action" in Article 53 is the only time that the phrase is
actually used in the U.N. Charter. Since the adoption of the U.N.
93. See Chemick, supranote 87, at 291.

94. See id.
95. See Robert Greenberger et al., Dodging the Bullet: An Invasion of Haitiis Averted by

Accord to Restore Aristide, .VALL ST. J., Sept. 19,1994, at Al.
96. See Andrew Deutz, Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era: International Organizations' Responses to Kurdistan, Yugoslavia and Haiti 27 (Apr. 28, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative & InternationalLaw). I draw upon Mr.
Deutz's analysis in my discussion of Haiti. See also Acevedo, supranote 6, at 137-38.
97. See Acevedo, supra note 6, at 141 ("For the members of the OAS, the notion that the
illegal replacement of a democratically elected government is still a matter essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of its member states, and thus immune from international scrutiny, is
no longer the axiomatic precept it once was...").
98. I am indebted to students in my International Organization class for emphasizing this
point with me.
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Charter, this ambiguity has presented numerous problems. In 1962,
for example, when the Organization of American States authorized
the "quarantine" of Cuba, some asserted that this action, which had
not been authorized by the Security Council, was an impermissible
"enforcement action." In 1983, the United States invaded the island
state of Grenada with the authorization of another Western Hemispheric arrangement, the Organization of East Caribbean States.'O°
Once again, some critics asserted that this invasion action was illegal
because the Security Council had failed to provide any kind of
authorization."0 ' In both cases, however, advocates for the actions
taken offered a variety of reasons why these uses of force did not
amount to "enforcement actions. ' °2
In the post-Cold War era, one of the most notable examples
highlighting the ambiguous meaning of "enforcement action" was the
intervention in Liberia by the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), an organization created to promote economic
cooperation. °3 On Christmas Eve, 1989, Charles Taylor, a Liberian
ex-patriot, invaded his home state with a rebel group known as the
National Patriotic Front of Liberia. Civil war ensued and thousands
of refugees began fleeing into Guinea and C6te d'Ivoire."'4 Despite
efforts by Liberia to take the matter to the U.N. Security Council,
that body did not address the conflict until 1991. By May of 1990,
however, ECOWAS began formal consideration of the Liberian matter. Initially, the regional body attempted to achieve a peaceful
resolution of the conflict. However, the situation in Liberia deterio99. See, e.g., Quincy Wright, The Cuban Quarantine,57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546 (1963).
100. See ROBERT J. BECK, THE GRENADA INVASION: POLITICS, LAW, AND FOREIGN
POLICY DECISIONMAKING (1993); David Wippman, Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the
Liberian Civil War, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER, supra note 1, at

157,184.
101. See AREND & BECK, supra note 1, at 64 (arguing that the regional action in Grenada
was impermissible under the U.N. Charter paradigm).
102. In support of the Cuba action, see Abram Chayes, Law and the Quarantineof Cuba, 41
FOREIGN AFF. 550 (1963); Leonard Meeker, Defensive Quarantineand the Law, 57 AM. J.
INT'L L. 515 (1963). In support of the Grenada invasion, see JOHN NORTON MOORE, LAW
AND THE GRENADA MISSION (1984).
103. The chronology in this section is drawn from Stephen John Stedman, Conflict and
Conciliation in Sub-SaharanAfrica, in INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 73, at 235,
250-253 and Abiodun Williams, Regional Peacemaking:ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War,
in THE DIPLOMATIC RECORD 1990-1991 213 (David D. Newsom ed., 1992).
104. "[I]n August 1990, the conflict had generated an estimated 250,000-375,000 refugees;
by October 1994, the war had produced an estimated 1.25 million refugees." Stedman, supra
note 103, at 252.

19961

THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

rated, and on August 24, 1990, ECOWAS dispatched a three thousand person force known as the ECOWAS Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG), which was charged by ECOWAS with "keeping the
peace, restoring law and order, and ensuring that the cease-fire is respected."' s
Was the action by ECOWAS, taken without Security Council
sanction, an "enforcement action"? A strong argument can be made
that it was. While the members of ECOWAS may have been concerned about the flow of refugees and the concern that the fighting
would spill over into neighboring states, ECOMOG's mandate to
keep the peace and restore law and order seemed to extend beyond
the limits of a purely defensive action allowed under the U.N. Charter. If the organization was acting solely under Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter as a collective self-defense body, its resolutions would logically state such a legal basis. Moreover, the protracted involvement
of ECOMOG in Liberia seems to indicate more ambitious goals than
collective self-defense.
In spite of these arguments that the ECOMOG action was an
impermissible "enforcement action," the U.N. Security Council did
not condemn the intervention when it finally addressed the matter on
January 22, 1991.16 Instead, the President of the Security Council issued a statement on behalf of the Security Council supporting the activities of ECOWAS: "The members of the Security Council commend the efforts made by the ECOWAS Heads of State and
Government to promote peace and normalcy in Liberia."'' 7 Does this
mean that the Security Council was providing an ex post facto
authorization for the intervention? If so, would it not have made
more sense for the Security Council to adopt a formal resolution to
clarify the the legal status of the Security Council's action? Perhaps
the Security Council's action meant that ECOMOG's military action
fell below the threshold of an "enforcement action." Some scholars,
including Professor John Norton Moore, have contended that regional intervention in civil conflict for purposes of promoting selfdetermination does not constitute an impermissible "enforcement ac105. See Peter da Costa, Life After Doe, 1990 WEST AFRICA 2510 (No. 3813, 24-30 September 1990). For further discussion on the creation of ECOMOG, see David Wippman, Military
Intervention, Regional Organizations, and Host-State Consent, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
224-30 (1996).
106. See U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 2974th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIPV.2974 (1991) (provisional verbatim record, statement of the President, Mr. Bagbeni Adeito Nzengeya).
107. Id. at 9.
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tion."'O' The Security Council may have been implicitly agreeing with
this contention, though it could have made that point more clearly.
Nevertheless, the Liberian conflict did not resolve the lack of clarity
surrounding the words "enforcement action." If anything, the reaction of the Security Council merely added more uncertainty to the
meaning of Article 53 of the U.N. Charter.
While these problems relating to both the nature of organizational jurisdiction and the meaning of "enforcement action" may not
have an easy solution, Professor Henrikson does make a novel suggestion. In his article in this Symposium, he proposes that the United
Nations establish formal relationships between itself and regional organizations." If the United Nations could conclude special agreements with certain regional organizations, perhaps these agreements
could delineate both jurisdiction and authority for the regional conduct of enforcement actions.' When crises arise, a set of guidelines
outlining appropriate responses would already be in place. Such an
arrangement would not be a panacea, but might be a beginning.
V. NEW TENSIONS BETWEEN REGIONALISM AND
GLOBALISM
In addition to the tension that can be traced directly to the U.N.
Charter framework, several other specific problems have emerged in
the new terrain of the post-Cold War world. These tensions were not
108. JOHN NORTON MOORE, supranote 102, at 23-32.
109. See Henrikson, supra note 34, at 63 (suggesting that special agreements concluded under Article 43 of the U.N. Charter "could... both harness the energies of regionally powerful
countries... and restrain them, precluding a devolution of the world system into spheres-ofinfluence order, or disorder."). ,
110. As Henrikson notes, such agreements could be under Article 43 of the United Nations
Charter. Id. Article 43 provides, in part, that:
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council,
on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces,
assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of
maintaining international peace and security.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council
and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be
subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
U.N. CHARTER art. 43. Henrikson highlights the reference in Article 43 to the possibility of
agreements between the Council and "groups of Members." Henrikson, supra note 34, at 6768.
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anticipated by the founders of the United Nations, but, nonetheless,
present serious challenges to the ability of multilateral institutions to
deal with conflict management. While numerous new problems
could be mentioned, three critical ones emerged from the Symposium
and are addressed in several subsequent articles. These are (1) the
increasing problem of internal conflict; (2) the issue of host-state consent; and (3) the legal status of "peacekeepers."
A. The Problem of Internal Conflict
In his article in this Symposium, Dr. Mats Berdal argues that one
of the difficulties with contemporary peace operations is the increasing involvement of multilateral institutions in internal conflict."'
When the U.N. Charter provisions on the use of force were drafted,
the framers intended that the United Nations would address interstate conflict.' These were the types of conflicts that had precipitated the first two World Wars and, accordingly, were the types of
conflicts that the new organization was designed to prevent. But in
the post-World War II era in general, and in the post-Cold War period in particular, civil wars and what might be called "mixed conflicts""--civil wars with external intervention-have been the predominant type of hostilities. Indeed, the most troublesome recent
conflicts-Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, and the Balkans-fall
into one of these two categories. Yet, since Chapter VII was intended to deal with state-to-state aggression, the U.N. Charter does
not precisely define a role for the United Nations in internal conflict.
In fact, Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter specifically prohibits the
United Nations from intervening into "matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state .... " While this provision is qualified by the statement that "th[is] principle shall not
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter
VII, 11 4 the question of when an internal matter does threaten inter111. Mats R. Berdal, The Security Council,Peacekeeping and InternationalConflict after the
Cold War, 7 DuKE J.COMP. & INT'LL. 71,75-76 (1996).

112. This thesis is developed in AREND & BECK, supranote 1, at 37. See also John Norton
Moore, The Use of Force in InternationalRelations: Norms Concerning the Initiation of Coercion, in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 85,139-140 (John Norton Moore et al.eds., 1990).
113. This term has been used in AREND & BECK, supranote 1, at 37. It is an abbreviation
of Professor John Norton Moore's term "mixed civil-international conflict." See John Norton
Moore, Toward an Applied Theory for the Regulation of Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR
IN THE MODERN VORLD 3 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974).
114. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7).
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national peace and security is not addressed.
The consequences of this lacuna are clear. In any given conflict,
regional organizations and the United Nations may differ on when an
internal crisis rises to the level of an internationalthreat. In the case
of Haiti, for example, it was clear that the Organization of American
States believed that the coup against Aristide presented an international problem," while the United Nations, at least initially, believed
that the matter was one of domestic jurisdiction."6
As such conflicts arise in the future, how will the international
community be able to address them when regional organizations and
the United Nations cannot agree on the nature of the threat? Conceivably, this lack of agreement could produce serious conflicts between the two types of organizations.
B. Host-State Consent
Another issue that arose during the Symposium was the problem
of host-state consent and the conduct of military operations-a
problem that both Professors David Wippman"7 and Christine Gray"'
discuss in their articles in this Symposium. As noted above, the U.N.
Charter framework for the collective use of force was designed to address problems caused by an aggressor state."9 The provisions in
Chapter VII, therefore, establish a procedure for the Security Council to authorize the use of force against a recalcitrant state-a state
that has threatened the peace, breached the peace, or committed an
act of aggression." Under this arrangement, force would be used
against a state for the purpose of correcting its behavior. If, for example, a particular state invaded its neighbor, the Security Council
could authorize states to use force to end the invasion. Consent was
not at issue because force was being used against a state purposely
without obtaining its consent.
In the period following the adoption of the U.N. Charter, how-

115. See Acevedo, supra note 6, at 119-20.
116. See Deutz, supra note 96, at 27, quoted in Anthony C. Arend, supranote 7, at 501.
117. Wippman, supra note 105.
118. Christine Gray, Case Study: Consentand United Nations Peacekeepingin Yugoslavia, 7
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 241 (1996).
119. See supra Parts III.A. and III.B.; see also AREND & BECK, supranote 112.
120. U.N. CHARTER art. 39 (giving the Security Council authority to determine if there is a
"threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression"). Under Article 42, the Security
Council is authorized to impose military sanctions against a state. Id. art. 42.
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ever, a new type of military operation has developed, which has become known as "peacekeeping.'' Peacekeeping, as it evolved after
1945, meant the interposition of a neutral force in an area of conflict
once hostilities have essentially ceased.1 '2 The purpose of such a
peacekeeping operation was to facilitate the withdrawal of troops,
supervise a cease-fire, and serve as a buffer against renewed fighting." Most importantly, peacekeeping was undertaken with the consent of the state on whose territory the forces were stationed, and
12 4
preferably with the consent of all the parties to the conflict.
Throughout the Cold War period, the United Nations and even some
regional organizations engaged in a variety of peacekeeping operations, most of which were quite successful.E
In the post-Cold War era, a new type of peace operation has
emerged. Although frequently called "peacekeeping", this type of
operation has involved the use of force in the territory of certain
states without consent of all parties. A notable example of this type
of operation was seen in Somalia. When the U.N. Security Council
created the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNISOM I) in
April of 1992," cease-fire agreements had been signed by the parties. 7 The purpose of this operation was generally in keeping with
the traditional meaning of peackeeping. ' As time progressed this
consent began to appear illusory,'29 yet the United Nations continued
to authorize further action. In December of 1992, the Council
121. Many works have been written on peacekeeping, including DIEHL, supra note 1; ALAN
JAMES, PEACEKEEPING IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1990); UNITED NATIONS, THE BLUE

HELMETS: A REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING (2d ed.1990); THE EVOLUTION OF
UN PEACEKEEPING, CASE STUDIES AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (William J. Durch ed.,

1993) [hereinafter THE EVOLUTION OF UN PEACEKEEPING].

122. See AREND & BECK, supranote 1, at 65-66.
123. William J. Durch, Introduction, in THE EVOLUTION OF UN PEACEKEEPING, supra
note 121, at 1, 3-4.
124. See id. at 4-5.
125. For a discussion of United Nations peacekeeping operations, see Sally Morphet, UN
Peacekeepingand Election-Monitoring,in UNITED NATIONS, DIVIDED WORLD, supra note 1,

at 183.
126. S.C. Res. 751, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3069th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/751 (1992).
127. Cease-fire agreements were concluded between the parties at Mogadishu on March 13,
1992. Id. at 1.
128. S.C. Res. 751, supra note 126, at 2 (stating that the mission of UNOSOM I in Somalia
is "to facilitate an immediate and effective cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of a
cease-fire throughout the country in order to promote the process of reconciliation and political
settlement in Somalia and to provide urgent humanitarian assistance.").
129. See Stedman, supra note 103, at 254-55.
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authorized member states "to use all necessary means to establish as
soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia."' This resulted in the establishment of the Unified
Task Force (UNITAF), a United States-led operation under U.N.
Charter VII of the U.N. Charter. Regardless of host-state consent,
UNITAF was to take military action if necessary to see that humanitarian assistance reached its destination. The United Nations had
therefore approved a "peacekeeping" operation that was not premised on consent. In fact, as the faction lead by Mohammed Farah
Aideed became increasingly belligerent," the U.N. Security Council
even authorized the Secretary-General "to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks.., to secure
the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for
prosecution, trial and punishment." 33 By this time, the United Nations was clearly not undertaking a neutral peacekeeping operation.
In light of this new type of operation, one of the critical questions now relates to consent. When is host-state consent necessary
for a United Nations or regional operation? What if, as in the case of
Somalia, there is no true state to give its consent? Is the level of consent required different depending upon whether the action is undertaken by the United Nations or a regional arrangement? These types
of questions are taken up in this Symposium by David Wippman and
Christine Gray. Professor Wippman explores the consent issue when
dealing with internal conflict. In an extensive review of state practice, he examines how perceptions of the legality of intervention vary
in light of the degree of control by a central government. '" Professor
Gray then explores the problems of host-state consent that emerged
in the specific case of U.N. peace operations in the Balkans. 13

130. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/794 (1992).
131. Under Security Council Resolution 794, UNITAF was provided with the mandate
"that action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations should be taken in order
to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible." S.C. Res. 794, supranote 130, at 3.
132. This faction was allegedly responsible for the deaths of twenty-four Pakistani
peacekeepers on June 5, 1993. See Report of the Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant
to Resolution 885 (1993) to Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II PersonnelWhich Led to
CasualtiesAmong Them, para. 117, U.N. Doc. S/1994/653 (1994).
133. S.C. Res. 837, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3229th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/837 (1993).
134. See Wippman, supranote 105, at 213-34.
135. See Gray, supranote 118, at 243-263.
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C. The Legal Status of Personnel
A final problem that emerged from the Symposium discussion is
the legal status of personnel engaged in multilateral peace operations. Not only did the framers of the U.N. Charter seem to assume
that U.N. uses of force would be undertaken only to fight recalcitrant
states, they also appear to have -assumed that these military actions
would be undertaken by contingents of military forces of the U.N.
member states. Thus, under Article 43 of the U.N. Charter, all members were to enter into special agreements with the United Nations
whereby they would place contingents of their forces at the disposal
of the Security Council.13 If the Security Council decided to authorize an enforcement action, it could call upon states to provide the
military force that they had promised in these agreements.3 7 The
U.N. Charter did not envision any kind of standing U.N. force, either
for enforcement actions or peacekeeping, and therefore it contains
no provisions explicitly discussing the legal status or protection of
such forces.
With the creation of U.N. forces-either for peacekeeping or
other purposes ----this gap in the law has raised much concern. In his
article below, Professor Sharp discusses many of these problems. He
first explores existing international law dealing with the protection of
military forces. 39 Sharp discusses the four Geneva Conventions of
1949 on the law of armed conflict and the two Geneva Protocols of
1977 to those Conventions,' 4' as well as other potential sources of law
on the question. Sharp then examines the more recent 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
(Safety Convention). 4' While the Safety Convention does attempt to
establish a clearer legal regime for the protection of U.N. personnel,
Sharp concludes that it is inadequate in its present form.42 He there136. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, para. 1. For the language of Article 43, see supra note 110.
137. Id. art. 43, para. 1.
138. Professor Sharp provides an excellent taxonomy of the variety of possible "peace operations." Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., Protectingthe Avatars of InternationalPeace and Security, 7
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'LL. 93,97-112 (1996).
139. Id. at. 113-44.
140. I at 120-27.
141. G.A. Res. 49/59, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 141, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/59
(1994); see Sharp, supranote 138, at 145-59.
142. Sharp, supra note 138, at 157 ("flits greatest shortcoming is that its defined category of
protected U.N. personnel is too narrowly circumscribed and the line it attempts to draw between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement is unclear.").
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fore discusses a number of difficulties with the Convention and
makes several recommendations for improvement.'43 In particular, he
proposes a "Draft Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions..
. Relating to the Protection of Civilians and Military Forces Operating Under the Authority of the United Nations." 1" This fascinating
proposal provides an important point of departure for further discussions on this issue.
Following Professor Sharp's article, Professor Christopher
Greenwood provides a slightly different view on the existing legal regime relating to the protection of United Nations peacekeepers.'45
After tracing the development of the law through the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the Safety Convention, Greenwood responds to Sharp's proposal. Like Sharp, Greenwood acknowledges
the existence of flaws within the current legal arrangement. But unlike Sharp, Greenwood does not believe that these problems call for
a "radical departure" 14 from the basic approach taken in the Geneva
and Safety Conventions. In fact, Professor Greenwood believes that
the effect of Professor Sharp's proposal would actually be to weaken
the legal regime for protecting peacekeepers."
Finally, it should be noted-especially given the theme of this
Symposium-that both Sharp'" and Greenwood' 49 have concerns
about the applicability of the protection regime to members of regional organizations. Professor Sharp attempts to address this problem by suggesting in his draft Protocol that personnel of other organizations that are acting under the authority of the United Nations
be given the same protection as members of a United Nations operations.'
VI. CONCLUSION
As multilateral activities continue into the next century, the relationship between the United Nations and the panoply of regional or-

143. See id. at 157-59.
144. Id. at 165-67.
145. Christopher Greenwood, Protection of Peacekeepers: The Legal Regime, 7 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 185 (1996).
146. See i. at 207.
147. See id.
at 205-06.
148. Sharp, supranote 138.
149. Greenwood, supranote 145, at 195-96.
150. Sharp, supra note 138, at 178-79.
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ganizations is likely to remain uneasy. The source of this tension can
be found in two places. Some current problems can be traced to the
drafting of the founding document of the United Nations itself.
Other contemporary difficulties have arisen out of circumstances unanticipated by the framers of the U.N. Charter. But whatever the
source, these problems have the potential to prevent the successful
management of international conflict by multilateral institutions.
Over the course of the conference which led to this Symposium
issue, a number of suggestions were made to improve relationships
between the United Nations and regional organizations. The problems mentioned in this introductory Article will be discussed in
greater depth in the articles that follow. Other problems will also be
presented, and perhaps more significantly, a host of specific recommendations will be made. It is to be hoped that the analysis of these
problems and the recommendations suggested will help inform members of the policy-making community as they attempt to craft the design for a new international system.

